Governments' responsiveness to citizens' preferences is a key assessment criterion of democratic quality. This paper assesses responsiveness to public opinion in European Union politics with the example of governments' position-taking in the Council of the EU. The analysis demonstrates that governments' willingness to adopt negotiation positions that reflect public opinion systematically varies with their electoral incentives flowing from domestic arenas. Governments behave responsive in EU legislative negotiations if they face majoritarian electoral systems at home, when elections are imminent, and when parties or EU-related events trigger the public salience of integration. These findings have important implications for the debate on the EU's democratic deficit and our understanding of democratic responsiveness outside the national political arena.
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despite intense debates about the union's alleged 'democratic deficit'. This article starts from the observation that claims-making about democratic responsiveness in the EU plays a key role in the democratic deficit debate. On the one hand, liberal intergovernmentalist sceptics of the democratic deficit stress that "EU policy-making is, in nearly all cases, (…) responsive to the demands of European citizens (…) in a way quite similar to national polities" (Moravcsik 2002: 605, 618) . On the other hand, the advocates of the democratic deficit thesis counter that even if EU policy-making might match people's preferences such a relationship is unlikely to represent stable, reliable, and causal public control. Instead, considering the severe lack of electoral accountability of EU politics, any correlation between people's will and EU policy-making is unlikely to be more than "happy coincidence" (Follesdal and Hix 2006: 556) .
This article assesses these claims with regard to the responsiveness of individual governments to their domestic public opinion in the Council of the European Union (subsequently 'the Council'). From an empirical perspective, this choice is reasonable as the Council has been consistently found to be the most influential institution in EU policy-making (compared to the European Parliament and the European Commission) (Costello and Thomson 2013; Franchino and Mariotto 2012; Thomson 2011) . Moreover, national governments play the key role in the liberal intergovernmentalist defence of EU democracy as they are theorised to be the main advocates of citizens' preferences in Brussels due to their accountability in national elections. This accountability is "the most fundamental source of the EU's legitimacy" (Moravcsik 2002: 619) and it renders decisions in the Council "as accountable to national citizens as decisions of national cabinets" (Follesdal and Hix 2006: 539) . Even proponents of the deficit thesis seem to admit that national governments are the most likely 'agents of responsiveness' at the EU level, since national elections are presently more functional in expressing people's preferences than second-order elections to the European Parliament (Hix and Marsh 2008) .
To assess governments' responsiveness in the Council, I analyse the impact of domestic public opinion on governments' initial negotiation positions towards a subset of legislative proposals published by the European Commission between 1996 and 2008. The analysis distinguishes between responsiveness on legislative issues that represented left-right conflicts (e.g. about the degree of economic regulation) and those that represented pro-anti integration conflicts (e.g. about the authority of EU institutions). I argue that domestic electoral considerations are central for governments' responsiveness efforts on both dimensions. However, the different roles the dimensions play in domestic party competition have important consequences. While governments will handle responsiveness on left-right as a 'routine task' they can highly tailor so as to best adapt their efforts to domestic electoral institutions and electoral cycles, responsiveness on pro-anti integration will be more of an 'ad hoc' nature in response to increasing public salience of the issue.
The findings demonstrate that governments' responsiveness efforts in negotiations on EU policies systematically vary with electoral incentives flowing from electoral formulas, the electoral cycle, and party competition as well as major events related to integration. The picture of responsiveness in
Council politics that emerges from these results is remarkably close to some of the more sceptic accounts of responsiveness in domestic politics.
Governments may shirk public opinion in contexts of low electoral pressure and realise other actors' or their own policy preferences in the EU arena, but they pander to the public when electoral incentives are compelling. Given the comparatively low salience and complex nature of much EU legislation, these results are more tangible than one might have expected. The net result supports the liberal intergovernmentalist conjecture that governments are generally capable of acting as 'agents of the public' in the Council, but it leaves the open question whether responsiveness on its own and of limited degree is enough.
The Electoral Connection in EU Policy-Making
In its simplest definition, democratic responsiveness refers to a situation, in which different levels of public opinion induce governments to implement corresponding levels of public policies (e.g. if people show higher levels of support for taxation, the government sets higher tax rates than in times of low support for taxation) (cp. Lax and Phillips 2012) .1 Traditionally, responsiveness is assumed to be highly contingent on democratic elections that serve citizens to express their policy-related preferences and hold governments accountable for the realisation of these preferences.
Elections induce responsiveness through two main mechanisms (Stimson et al. 1995) . Firstly, citizens use their vote in elections to (re-)shape the composition of parliament and government so that elected policy-makers best share their respective policy preferences and are likely to implement corresponding policies. This mechanism of 'electoral turnover' is accompanied by a second that is based on the idea that policy-makers may 1 Responsiveness is often distinguished from 'congruence' that does not only refer to correlations between opinion and policy but to an actual match (e.g. if people show support for a new tax rate of 10%, this exact rate is implemented).
engage in 'rational anticipation' of this turnover. In order to forestall electoral sanctions at the end of the legislative term they may align policy-making to changes in public preferences during the term. This is achieved through a close tracking of and reaction to public opinion as the primary signal of public preferences. From a game theoretical perspective, electoral turnover highlights the role of elections as adverse selection games, in which citizens attempt to select policy-makers that are 'good' types sharing their preferences (Fearon 1999; Mansbridge 2009 ). In turn, rational anticipation captures their role as sanctioning games, in which policy-makers calculate how much they can deviate from the principal's preferences without being punished at the ballot box (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986 ).
Given the central role of the electoral connection, three characteristics of EU politics cast doubts on the potential relevance of responsiveness. A first concern pertains to a lack of inherent salience or importance of EU policymaking for the public. The EU's core policy competences in the regulation of market activities and technical standards arguably carry much less inherent salience for voters than areas like social policy, labour market policy, or health care. Not surprisingly, the literature has clearly established that issue salience increases responsiveness -even though a 'minimum level' of salience is hard to identify (Lax and Phillips 2009; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 2004) . A second concern is the complexity of EU policy-making. Many EU issues qualify as 'hard' issues that are largely technical instead of symbolic (such as the definition of technical standards), and the multilevel nature of the EU polity makes it hard for voters to identify responsible actors for decisions.
Issue and polity complexity impair issue voting, and in consequence, representational linkages are either weaker or elite-driven (Carmines and Stimson 1980; Hill and Hurley 1999; Hurley and Hill 2003; Wlezien and Soroka 2012 On the other hand, media coverage of the EU has shown an upward trend over time, with peaks of attention around key events (Boomgaarden et al. 2010 (Boomgaarden et al. , 2013 .
These changes have enabled EU politics to enter voters' electoral calculus. On the other side, the role of integration conflicts for electoral competition is much less stable and universal.
As of yet integration conflicts do not represent a fully matured cleavage with strong social and institutional backing in the classical Lipset-Rokkan (1967) sense, but they are rather an often fragile, evolving issue of electoral competition (Carmines and Stimson 1986; 1989; 1993) . Whether conflicts over integration become electorally salient is highly conditional on factors such as mobilisation activities of strategic politicians, external disruptions (e.g. economic crises), or local institutional variations (e.g. referendum constraints). Chance is a major force behind these factors and it renders the evolution of the integration issue neither universal, nor unidirectional, nor necessarily permanent (Carmines and Stimson 1993: 158-162 ; Van der Eijk and Franklin 2007) . Instead, it is more likely that electoral competition over integration is intermittent, fluctuating over time and across countries (e.g. Stevens 2013 ).
These differences have important implications for the mode in which governments will approach responsiveness. In essence, responsiveness on left-right should be a routine task for the government to secure office in the next elections ('routine mode'). Governments' efforts in that respect can be highly structured, long-term planned, and adapted to the domestic institutional framework. This is efficient as there is no doubt that left-right will remain electorally salient. Therefore, factors immediately linked to national elections and the electoral cycle will influence responsiveness. In contrast, responsiveness on pro-anti integration should be highly contingent on times and en-vironments in which the integration issue evolves and develops electoral salience (or has the potential to do so). Governments' responsiveness efforts will be rather 'ad hoc' as the issue's long-term fate remains largely uncertain ('ad hoc mode'). Therefore, factors increasing the salience of the EU issue will prompt responsiveness.
Dimension-Specific Hypotheses about Responsiveness
To test these claims I derive a series of dimension-specific hypotheses that allow determining whether governments systematically react to electoral incentives that are associated with different factors on each dimension. However, there are two caveats concerning this general conclusion. Firstly, the idea that seat-vote elasticities are strictly greater in SMD than in PR systems only holds if the two major parties are at eye level. If one party dominates by a wide vote margin the seat-vote elasticity can approach 0 under SMD, while it will be very close to 1 under PR in all situations of dominance (Chang, Kayser, and Rogowski 2008: 749-750; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008: 313-314) . Secondly, SMD also creates incentives for governments to over-respond to the preferences and opinions of citizens in marginal districts that may often markedly differ from centrist or average opinion (e.g. Persson and Tabellini 2003; Rickard 2012 ). Wlezien and Soroka (2012 : 1413 -1414 have suggested that coalition dynamics are another factor impeding responsiveness in PR systems. While SMD normally produces single-party governments that are versatile in reacting to (changing) opinion, PR's multi-party governments have to engage in coordination that will involve deterrent transaction costs. In total, I expect SMD to have advantages for responsiveness:
H2: Governments will be more responsive to domestic public opinion regarding leftright conflicts in majoritarian electoral systems.
Turning to the pro-anti integration dimension governments' responsiveness should be associated with factors increasing the salience of integration. I discuss two fundamental factors here: parties' mobilisation activities and events related to integration.
First, as party elites play a crucial role in mobilizing integration in the domestic public sphere, and thus making it relevant to voters' choices, government responsiveness should be higher when parties increase their emphasis on integration (Börzel and Risse 2009; Carmines and Stimson 1986, 1989; van der Eijk and Franklin 2007) . The point can be best illustrated by stressing the influence of political elites on media coverage of pro-anti integration conflicts. While left-right issues often enter domestic media naturally as they connect to people's daily life experiences (e.g. unemployment, immigration), emerging policy dimensions often lack such inherent news factors (Soroka 2002) . This is precisely a consequence of their comparative lack of firm basis in pre-existing social cleavages. In the case of pro-anti integration, the abstract and unobtrusive nature of questions of authority and competence allocation between national and EU institutions needs some additional vehicle to become newsworthy. Media studies confirm that this role can be played by political elites communicating their stances on these issues and reframing them to better fit the domestic context, which induces media to put them on the agenda (Adam 2007; Boomgaarden et al. 2013 ; Van der Pas and Vliegenthart 2015) . In turn, increased levels of (media) information on integration have been found to facilitate 'EU issue voting' (e.g. Hobolt and Wittrock 2011; Hobolt 2005; ).
I therefore expect that wherever domestic parties increase their emphasis on pro-anti integration, this will be related to higher public salience of such issues and induce governments to be more responsive: 
Data and Measurement
To test these hypotheses I investigate responsiveness as the impact of public opinion on national ministers' policy positions on concrete pieces of legislation discussed in the Council. (Thomson et al. 2006 (Thomson et al. , 2012 . DEU is based on 349 semi-structured interviews with experts from member states' permanent representations and EU institutions, who were asked to report legislative issues that raised controversy and locate governments on corresponding spatial policy scales. It is the most widelyused dataset on EU decision-making and has been employed in a diverse range of applications. Importantly, DEU is basically a selection of the most salient issues in EU policy-making as proposals had to be mentioned in European media and actors had to be divided on key issues regarding the proposal to be included in the data.
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In order to relate the DEU policy scales to the two dimensions of interest, an original coding scheme was developed to identify controversies that related to substantive left-right or pro-anti integration conflicts. The guiding principle was to construct categories for both dimensions that correspond to the DEU issues and at the same time closely reflect our best knowledge from the public opinion literature about what citizens associate with the concepts 'left-right'
and 'pro-anti integration' (see below). This guarantees a high substantive relevance between the dependent and independent variable. The resulting scheme consists of eight categories representing the left-right dimension; they cover conflicts ranging from economic regulation, over consumer and environmental protection, to human and civil rights. Four categories capture the integration dimension, covering aspects ranging from harmonisation over EU level authority to the delaying of EU legislative acts.
The coding of the DEU issues reveals that about 61% of the issues fall into at least one left-right category and 31% into at least one pro-anti integration category (with 12% relevant on both dimensions). 22% did neither relate to any left-right nor to any pro-anti integration category (e.g. they related to geographical cleavages).
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This confirms the claim that left-right and pro-anti integration are the two main dimensions in EU policy-making representing 5 Tracking governments' behaviour in the Council with DEU is therefore broadly comparable to tracking American legislators on the basis of ADA (Americans for Democratic Action) or similar scores that also focus on salient, key policy issues (see Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995) . 6 The inter-coder reliability for the decision whether an issue related to a dimension or not was assessed with the help of Krippendorff's alpha, which is 0.88 for the left-right and 0.73 for the pro-anti integration dimension.
78% of all policy controversies, with left-right as the primary dimension being about twice as salient as pro-anti integration. Wherever necessary the DEU scale with a predefined range of 0-100 was linearly transformed so as to ensure that the most 'right' and the most 'integrationist' option respectively are represented by 100 and the most left / least integrationist by 0. liberties and human rights (Cohrs et al. 2005 (Cohrs et al. , 2007 , and a variety of The moderating factors hypothesised in H1 to H4 are measured as follows.
First, to test whether the electoral cycle influences government responsiveness I operationalise the distance to the next, scheduled national legislative elections in 100 day units.
7
Second, the impact of majoritarian electoral systems is measured with a variable that is 0 for PR and mixed systems with disproportionality correction, 1 for mixed systems that do not correct disproportionality arising from the majoritarian part (Lithuania), and 2 for pure SMD plurality or two-round systems (the UK and France).
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Third,
whether an increase in parties' emphasis on EU integration is related to stronger responsiveness is measured with the help of the Comparative Manifesto Project's (CMP) database (Volkens et al. 2013 ). This is operationalised as the seat-weighted average percentage of quasi-sentences parliamentary parties devote to EU integration (positive as well as negative statements) in their electoral manifestos. To capture times in which integration is politicised, I linearly interpolate over time and measure the 7 Results do not change when coding the distance to the next elections that really occurred, i.e . to account for early elections. 8 I obtain the same results when using a simple dummy for SMD systems. change in party emphasis over the last two years.
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Fourth, to determine the effects of major EU-related events I use a dummy variable that is 1 six months before and after the following events: national referendums on integration, signing of EU treaties, accession to the EU, introduction of the euro currency, elections to the European Parliament, holding the Council presidency.
In order to ascertain which mechanism -rational anticipation or electoral turnover -is responsible for any responsiveness found, I include measures of 
Analysis and Results
To model the relationship between governments' policy positions and opinion, I use mixed effects regressions. All models include random intercepts for the policy issue in question, the legislative proposal from which the issue emanated, and the country that took the position. Moreover, I include a random slope that allows the public opinion effect to vary in strength between the different policy issues. The hypotheses H1 to H4 are tested by including interaction terms between public opinion and the respective moderating variable.
Hence, all models take the following general form: In a first step, I restrict the sample to all issues that relate to left-right conflicts. However, the coefficient on public opinion is virtually unchanged, which indicates that in order to forestall future electoral sanctions governments respond to public opinion beyond their electoral promises.
10 Where time series data is available, responsiveness can be studied on the basis of first differences or distributed lags models. However, the DEU data does not qualify as a time series, mainly due to a large gap between 1999 and 2004. I therefore define responsiveness here in a static sense, which is common practice where time series data is lacking (see Gilens 2012; Lax and Phillips 2009, 2012 In a second step, I restrict the sample to all issues relating to conflicts about pro-anti integration. The results are reported in Table 2 . Model 1B estimates the adopted policy position (0 'least integrationist' to 100 'most integrationist' option) as a function of pro-anti integration opinion and the control variables.
In line with the findings on left-right, governments' position-taking on proanti integration also responds to public opinion with a significant coefficient at the 5% level. The more supportive the public is of the country's EU membership, the more likely it is that the government adopts positions that imply more EU authority, more harmonisation, or more EU task expansion.
Model 2B demonstrates that like on the left-right dimension responsiveness on pro-anti integration is also a result of rational anticipation as opinion impacts on government positions even if controlling for the electoral promises of the cabinet parties.
11
11 In addition, the insignificant coefficient on the CMP measure indicates that government parties that make pro integrationist electoral promises do not adopt more integrationist policy positions. This supports the claim that governments do not routinely engage in their representative function on pro-anti integration. Models 3B-5B investigate whether governments employ an 'ad hoc mode' when responding on pro-anti integration. Model 3B tests whether governments are more responsive in case domestic parties increase the electoral salience of proanti integration in their manifestos (H3). The hypothesis is supported by a significant interaction term indicating that governments care more about opinion when EU integration is politicised in the party system. Model 4B tests whether major events related to EU integration play a pivotal role in making governments wary of public opinion on pro-anti integration (H4). The results entirely support this conjecture: In fact, while the interaction term is significant, the main term on opinion has now dropped close to zero indicating that governments only consider opinion around such events but disregard it at other times. Model 5B including both interactions confirms these findings. In total, these considerations show that public opinion can exert a substantive influence on legislative negotiations in the Council. This is particularly evident when considering that with France and the UK two of the three 'big'
EU governments face majoritarian electoral systems at home, and that about 50% of all positions on pro-anti integration in the period investigated were adopted in a context of major events related to integration. In total, the models predict significant marginal effects of opinion for about 50% of all observations on the left-right and 40% of all observations on the pro-anti integration dimension.
Robustness Checks and Causal Inference
This section reports results of robustness checks addressing three types of concerns. All results are provided in Table 3 . First, I address the theoretical concern that the moderators of responsiveness may not be dimension-specific.
Instead, the salience of EU integration triggered by parties and EU-related events could 'spill-over' and make governments also more responsive on the left-right dimension of EU policy-making. Similarly, governments could also structure their responsiveness efforts on pro-anti integration with a view to national elections (e.g. as they expect enduring public salience of integration).
To test these assertions I re-estimate the final Models 5a + 5b interchanging the moderators between the dimensions. The results strongly support the claim of dimension specificity. The only weakly significant interaction term is that between left-right opinion and events. However, it indicates that leftright opinion is less considered by governments before and after events related to integration, which might simply show that governments shift their focus towards the pro-anti integration dimension in such times.
Second, I address concerns about the distribution of the dependent variable.
Since a significant fraction of DEU policy scales are binary (e.g. the legislative
12 The findings on the control variables. On left-right, the results support the presence of a redistribution cleavage, with the 'rich' governments advocating more leftist policy positions. Patterns of uploading of domestic policies are also partially visible as governments with more freedom of business at home take more rightist positions. Importantly, I find no control variable significant on pro-anti integration, which underscores that this dimension is less rooted -not only in national but also -in cross-national cleavages. A remaining question is whether these relationships can be interpreted causally. The entire responsiveness literature is quite aware that elites' priming, framing, and persuasion attempts are a potential source of 'simultaneity' or even 'reversed causality', so that governments may more shape opinion than being influenced by it. However, most findings of this study point towards a bottom-up process. Most importantly, the relationship between opinion and governments' positions only becomes significant with increasing electoral pressure in the domestic arena -be it an approaching election, an elastic electoral formula, or the increased electoral salience of integration due to party emphasis or EU events. As Jacobs and Shapiro (2000: 43) have argued, manipulation of opinion by elites is the strategic choice in times of low electoral pressure but not if electoral incentives are imminent since then "it is less risky and faster to respond to public opinion than attempt to change it". Hence, if elite-led dynamics were prevalent, we should detect the strongest relationships between opinion and positions distant from elections, in PR systems, and in times of low public salience of integration.
This is precisely the opposite of what we find. Similarly, scholars have established that public salience is a key prerequisite for responsiveness (Burstein 2006; Lax and Phillips 2009; Wlezien 2004 ).
Accepting democracy in nation states as the standard to which we should compare the EU, the results then suggest that governments in the Council behave approximately as responsive to public demands as they and other top executives do in domestic politics. Differences between the two contexts are probably rather a question of the precise degree of responsiveness than of a fundamentally different logic at play.
This has important implications for the debate about the EU's democratic deficit as it supports the liberal intergovernmentalist conjecture that national governments -at least to some extent -defend public preferences in Brussels.
In contrast, the generalised claim of the advocates of a democratic deficit that relationships between public preferences and EU policy-making will never be more than "happy coincidence" is not supported by this analysis. and policy-making complexity in an international political arena. This should encourage research on the boundary conditions for responsiveness. Without doubt, this study suggests that while being generally conditional on electoral incentives, responsiveness may be more resilient in adverse environments than many scholars could imagine.
